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PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
(Continued)
IV.
ASSIGNMENTS
B
Interests in the Real Security-Equities of Ownership-
Defensive Equities---"Mortgages" securing non-negotiable
instruments.-Where the personal security and the real se-
curity of a mortgage are evidenced by one instrument ob-
viously a separation of the two securities would never be
expected or contemplated as probable. The ownership of
both would be vested in one person, the mortgagee or the
assignee. But where the two securities are evidenced by
separate instruments difficult questions of ownership arise.
These have already been considered to some extent in the
discussion of the necessity of a formal, written assignment.
Courts of equity consider the personal security, that is, the
debt, the principal part of the mortgage transaction or re-
lation and the real security, that is, what is ordinarily called
the "mortgage," as the incident or accessory, and take the
view that a transfer of the personal security carries with it
a transfer of the real security. Omne principale trahit ad se
accessorium. Even if the personal security is in the form
of a promissory note made payable to the mortgagee, or
bearer, and so transferable by delivery, any holder of the
note can avail himself of the security afforded by the mort-
gage executed to secure its payment. While this doctrine
would be applicable in courts of law in "lien" states, it has
rarely been involved in a controversy at law in any jurisdic-
tion. The principle has been applied even when the trans-
feree of the personal security was ignorant of the real secur-
ity at the time of the transfer of the former security.1 But
I Tiffany, Real Property (2nd ed.) 2524.
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the real security has not been held to follow the personal
security as an incident in all cases. Ordinarily a transfer of
the real security is intended by the parties to the assignment
of the personal security, and has been made, in some in-
stances, by a delivery only; but it is not a necessary conclu-
sion in all cases that such was the intention of the parties.
If the transferee of the personal security is forbidden by
statute from dealing in real-estate securities, an intent that
the real security be transferred can not be inferred from the
transfer of the personal security alone.2 Of course it would
be easier for the transferee of the personal security to realize
it by using the real security for this purpose where he has
possession of the real security as upon a delivery of it. But
where there has been no delivery or written assignment of
the real security, it is ordinarily considered as being owned
in equity by the transferee of the personal security and he
can avail himself of it in order to realize his mortgage debt.
This principle would apply in the "title" states, for the legal
title to the real security would be held, in equity, for the
benefit of the owner of the personal security ordinarily. The
latter would be entitled to subject the real security to his
benefit in realizing the mortgage debt or enjoin its use to
his injury. Jones says that "When the debt and the legal
title to the mortgaged estate are separated . . . if the holder
of the latter will not voluntarily use this title for the benefit
of the person entitled to the use of it, it may be necessary
to resort to a bill in equity to charge the party who has the
legal title as a trustee for the holder of the debt, or to assign
the mortgage to him, whereupon he will be compelled either
to maintain a suit at law, or to foreclose for the benefit of
the assignee, or to assign the mortgage to the holder of the
debt. Courts of law will enforce this equitable principle so
far as they are able." 3 The principle that control over the
personal security involves control over the legal interest of
2 See Franklin Say. Bank v. Colby, 75 N. W. 346 (Iowa 1898).
3 Jones on Mortgages (7th ed.) § 818.
PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
the mortgagee in the mortgaged realty, whether it is the real
security itself or the incidental rights that are recognized
in some jurisdictions as accompanying the transfer of the
legal title to the mortgagee, is well illustrated in the Maine
decisions. In Lord v. Crowell4 the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion at law,-a writ of entry,-to recover possession of the
mortgaged land. He was assignee of the mortgage debt evi-
denced by promissory notes. The defendant was in posses-
sion of the mortgaged premises as a purchaser for value,
without actual notice of the fact that his grantor's title was
any other than a fee simple, under a warranty deed from the
mortgagee, who was in possession at the time of the transfer-
taking the rents and profits. The plaintiff subsequently sued
the mortgagor on the mortgage notes, recovered judgment,
and levied execution on the mortgaged land. The effect of
these proceedings by the plaintiff was held to be that the
mortgage debt was satisfied; that the interest of the mort-
gagee was extinguished, and, consequently, the interest of
the defendant was also extinguished; that the record itself
disclosed the nature and infirmity of the interest the de-
fendant assumed to purchase, and that he had no defense
even to the action at law.' A fortiori the same result would
be reached where, instead of a conveyance of the mort-
gaged premises by the mortgagee in possession, under the
Maine doctrine, he assigns the real security, by a deed of
assignment, to one person and assigns the mortgage debt to
another. If the mortgagee assigns the note secured by the
mortgage to a third person, without assigning the real secur-
ity, he holds the latter in trust for the holder of the note;
and if the mortgagee assigns the real security to still another
person, he can not thereby assign a greater right than he
4 75 Me. 399 (1883).
5 This decision is summarized in Hussey v. Fisher, 47 AtI. 525, 528 (Me.
1900), by Emery, J., who was a member of the Maine court at that time. While
he did not take part in the decision, his statement as to notice to the defend-
ant must be accepted aA a fact, although it does not appear from the decision
as to whether the mortgage was recorded.
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has, for the mortgage itself would constitute notice to the
assignee of the nature and extent of the interest transferred.8
Where the real security is given to secure two or more
promissory notes executed by the mortgagor, the mortgagee
is said to hold the mortgaged realty in trust, charged with
the mortgage debt. If the mortgagee negotiates one of the
notes, without the expression of any intent, either to retain
the real security to his own use as security for his remain-
ing note, or notes, to the security of which alone perhaps it
is adequate, or to hold it in trust for himself and his in-
dorsee, and when therefore the mortgagee has a beneficial
interest in the real security, the question arises as to wheth-
er any resulting trust would be implied in favor of the in-
dorsee. Of course this question would not be of any im-
portance where the real security is of sufficient value to pay
all of the notes or other obligations secured by it; and if the
mortgagor is solvent it probably would not be of any great
importance. But where the real security is inadequate for
this purpose, or the mortgagor is insolvent, many controver-
sies have arisen between the mortgagee-assignor and his
assignee of a part of the secured indebtedness, resulting in
an irreconcilable conflict of judicial opinion upon the prob-
lem. This class of cases is closely allied with the cases in-
volving controversies between successive assignees of all of
the several promissory notes, or bonds, or other evidences
of indebtedness, secured by a real security in particular
transactions; and in some jurisdictions the same rule has
been applied to both classes of cases. One view, that seems
to be sustained by the numerical weight of authority,7 is
6 See Lord v. Crowell, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 403.
7 See collection of cases in Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 149. In some jurisdictions the
assignee is not entitled to priority of lien over his mortgagee-assignor, but the
same rule of distribution is applied as among several assignees where all of the
mortgage notes, or other evidences of debt, are assigned.
In Donley v. Hays, 17 Serg. & Rawle 400 (1828), a case supporting the
minority rule, it was intimated that if the mortgagee-assignor has guaranteed
payment of the note assigned a different rule would have been applied. The same
suggestion is contained in Cooper v. Ulmann, Walk. Ch. 251 (1843), another
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that where the mortgagee assigns or transfers one, or a part,
of the notes secured by his mortgage, if the mortgage se-
cures more than one note, and retains the other, or others,
and the real security is not sufficient to pay all the notes, the
mortgagee is not entitled to participate in the real security
to realize on the note, or notes, retained by him in compe-
tition with his assignee. "And the same rule applies where a
person to whom all of a series of notes have been assigned
assigns one of the series to a third person." In Lawson v.
Warren 8 the basis of this principle is stated as follows:
"The reason the assignee is to be preferred is founded on the plain-
est principle of equity. When two notes are assigned to different per-
sons, they are both presumed to have paid value, and they must share
equally in the proceeds of the mortgaged property in order to pre-
serve the equality which is equity. But to apply the same rule between
the mortgagee and a person to whom he had transferred one of the
notes would lead to inequality. For illustration, say that the mort-
gagee holds two notes for $1,000 each. He assigns one of them for
value. The property securing their payment only brings $1,000, or
enough to pay one note. If the mortgagee shares in the proceeds he
will get out of the debt $1,500, the $1,000 he received for the first
note and the $500 he receives from the proceeds of the mortgaged
property, while the assignee for half the debt only receives $500.
The mortgagee would thus receive more than if he had kept both
notes. This is not right."
According to this principle, the assignment of one of the
mortgage notes operates, ipso facto, as an assignment of the
mortgage lien, entitling the assignee to preference of pay-
ment out of the real security as against the mortgagee-
assignor who retains the remainder of the mortgage notes;
and this is true without reference to the order of maturity
of the notes.9 Acquisition of the title to the note assigned,
whether it is a legal or an equitable title, operates to give
case supporting the minority rule. In such a case the Supreme Court of Texas
has suggested that the doctrine of subrogation would probably be applied if the
mortgagee-assignor did not assert any interest in the real security; or, if he
did assert an interest, the assignee would be entitled to priority of lien. See
Cannon v. McDaniel, 46 Tex. 303, 313 (1876).
8 124 Pac. 46, 48, 49 (Okla. 1912).
0 McClintic v. Wise's Adm'ors & Als., 25 Gratt. 448, 18 Am. Rep. 694 (1874).
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the assignee the benefit of the real security so far as neces-
sary to enable him to realize the amount he has paid for the
note. It may seem that if the assignee purchased the note at a
price which was much less than the face value of the note,
it would be evidence of an agreement that the mortgagee-
assignor share equally in the real security. But the ade-
quacy of the consideration paid by the assignee should only
be considered, if at all, where the terms of the assignment
are in doubt. In such a case, if the assignee of the note was
unaware of the existence of the real security, there would
be a stronger case in favor of the mortgagee-assignor sharing
in the real security; still it would impair the value of the
assignment if the mortgagee-assignor shares in the real se-
curity with the assignee. By analogy, it is said that "The
vendor of part of an estate which he has encumbered by his
own act, cannot demand contribution of the vendee, being
bound, both at law and in equity, to apply the residue in
the satisfaction of the debt. . . . Yet the vendee might,
with equal plausibility, be said to have got the estate at an
under value, in consideration of its bearing a share of the
burden on the whole. But the vendor is bound to discharge
the encumbrance in case of the vendee, even where the latter
has not paid a valuable consideration (Sir William Harbert's
Case, 3 Co. Rep. lb, 12). And why shall not the assignee
of a chattel have the full benefit of the thing, whether the
bargain be a good or a bad one?" "
The priority of lien in favor of the assignee, where the
mortgagee assigns one or more of the mortgage notes and
retains the remainder, may be varied by the assignment
agreement. A few cases have considered this principle from
the viewpoint of the effect of the indorsement on the note
or other personal security transferred. Where the mort-
gagee-assignor indorses a guaranty of payment on the note
10 Dissenting opinion of Gibson, C. J., in Donley v. Hays, op. cit. supra
note 7, at pp. 406, 407. In Mcclintic v. Wise's Adm'ors & Als. it is said that the
sayne principles apply in both classes of cases.
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transferred, the Supreme Court of Texas has considered this
as sufficient to give priority of lien to the assignee. 1 In a
later case, Walcott v. Carpenter,"2 the Court of Civil Ap-
peals of Texas thought that if a guaranty of payment would
have such effect, an indorsement in blank would also oper-
ate to give the assignee priority of lien, saying:
"An indorsement in blank amounts to more than merely a simple
transfer of the title to the note. It is also a contract on the part
of the indorser to pay the same to the indorsee, or holder, if not paid
at maturity by the maker of the note when duly presented for pay-
ment, upon due and reasonable notice given to him of its non-pay-
ment at the time by the maker.... The material point of difference
between guaranty and indorsement, as referable to the original payee
in the note that is transferred by guaranty or indorsement, is as to
the extent of liability when measured by the diligence due from the
creditor, in order to charge such guarantor or indorser.... Both are
agreements to pay the note."
But the court went on to say that if there was no agreement
of priority, priority should be sustained in order to prevent
circuity of action. The action in this case was one to fore-
close a vendor's lien,"3 brought by the vendor of certain land
who had expressly reserved the lien to secure the payment
of certain notes given for the purchase price. One of these
notes had been indorsed in blank to one J., who transferred
it to Carpenter; the latter was made a party to the fore-
closure proceedings. The pleadings of the plaintiff and Car-
penter asked that the rights of the parties be adjusted be-
tween them out of the sale of the property; and Carpenter
further claimed that the plaintiff was personally liable on
the indorsement, and that the maker was insolvent. The
court held that the fund realized from the sale of the prop-
11 Perry v. Dowell, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 96 84 S. W. 833 (1905), writ of
error to judgment refused in Anderson v. Perry, 98 Tex. 493, 85 S. W. 1138
(1905). The court said: "We think that guaranty inconsistent with the reten-
tion of a co-ordinate lien for the payment of the notes retained by the company
[the indorser] . . ."
12 132 S. W. 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
13 The principle is the same whether the real security is in the form of a
vendor's lien or a real estate mortgage.
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erty should be used as the rights of the-parties to the trans-
action required it to be used in order to avoid circuity of
action; and that Carpenter was accordingly entitled to pri-
ority in payment out of this fund. In Fitch v. Kennard14
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held that an indorsee
"without recourse" of one of the security notes was not en-
titled to priority of lien, on the theory that the indorsement
negatived any intention to become liable for the payment
of the note to the indorsee. The plaintiff had sold certain
real property to one K, expressly reserving a vendor's lien
to secure the payment of four notes given as a part of the
consideration for the purchase. The note maturing first was
assigned to one A.K. by an indorsement "without recourse."
The latter was made a party defendant to this action to fore-
close the lien. The court said:
"Appellant did not in any manner undertake to pay or guarantee
the payment of the note assigned, nor did he agree that, in the event
of a foreclosure sale, it should be entitled to priority of payment over
the other notes, still held by him, out of the proceeds of such a
sale . .. 'Whatever uncertainty may have attended the solution of
this question hitherto, it is believed that the matter is now settled by
the decisions of our court, and that with us the rule is that where
several notes are given for the same land, having a lien upon it for
their payment, and are assigned to different parties, all have equal
rights to have satisfaction out of the land, and this without reference
to the order in which they may have been assigned or which first
matured.... Nor do we think the case is different when the vendor
himself may retain one of the notes. There is no presumption arising
from the transfer of one or more of them that he intends to waive his
right to share pro rata in -the common fund for that which he has
retained. Of course, he may waive his privilege, but that he has done
so shall be made to appear by the proof.' "
Where there is no agreement as to priority of lien, there is
a conflict in the Texas decisions " as to whether the assignee
of one of the mortgage notes is entitled to a preference to,
14 133 S. W. 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
15 See Douglass v. Blount, 55 S. W. 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), and review
of the Texas cases therein; and see Fitch v. Kennard, op. cit. supra note 14,
and review of the Texas cases therein.
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or only entitled to share pro rata with, the mortgagee-as-
signor, who retains one or more of the notes secured by the
same real security, in the proceeds of the real security upon
a foreclosure by the latter.
In Rolston v. Brockway 16 the mortgagee transferred a
part of the notes secured by his mortgage, with his full in-
dorsement thereon, and, at the time of the transfer, the
mortgagee made a memorandum on the mortgage to the
effect that the notes transferred were paid in full; the in-
dorsee of the notes apparently knew of and consented to the
making of this memorandum. The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin held that this constituted an agreement that the in-
dorsee should not share, much less have priority of lien, in
the proceeds of the real security where the mortgagee had
foreclosed the mortgage.
A different view is presented in McClintic v. Wise's
Adm'ors & Als.' 7 In this case W. sold certain land to M.,
receiving three bonds as a part of the consideration. One
bond was paid in W.'s lifetime. The latter assigned one of the
remaining bonds to S., and, through a series of successive
assignments, H. became the ultimate assignee. The admin-
istrators of W. brought a suit to have the land sold and the
bond, that W. had retained, paid. The bill alleged that the
complainants were uninformed as to the ownership of the
bond that had been assigned. The land was sold, and the
commissioner was directed to collect the money and pay the
complainants. H., upon his petition, which was filed subse-
quently, was made a party defendant in the suit, and filed
his answer, claiming that his bond was still unpaid, and that
he was entitled to priority of lien in the proceeds of the sale.
The administrators replied that H. had lost his right to sub-
ject the land to the payment of his bond by his laches in not
16 23 Wis. 407 (1868). (After the foreclosure had taken place the indorsee
brought this action to enforce payment of the notes assigned to him by a fore-
closure of the mortgage.)
17 Op. dt. supra note 9.
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suing M., who had in the meantime become insolvent. It
was held that H. was entitled to priority of lien out of the
proceeds of the sale, even though the bond assigned to him
matured subsequently to that retained by W. In discussing
the administrators' contention that H. had, by his want of
due diligence against the obligor, lost his right of recourse
against the estate of the latter, the court said:
"I do not think the right of the assignee to subject the land fund
results at all from the personal liability of the assignor, or that the
failure to pursue the obligor affects the right to enforce the lien upon
the land. The assignee. . . has three remedies: An absolute right to
resort to the debtor himself; 2d, to the lien upon the land; and 3d,
contingently to the assignor himself. The loss of the latter remedy,
by the want of due diligence, can no more affect the right of recourse
to the land than it can affect the right of reverting to the debtor
himself. The assignment of the bond is, ipso facto, an assignment of
the lien. Having once vested by the assignment, that lien is not di-
vested by the failure to sue the debtor. The assignee having two
remedies, both absolute and undoubted, may resort to either.... the
fact that the assignee had no recourse upon the assignor did not
sever the lien from the note; but as he (the assignee) acquired the
equitable right to the [bond] 18. .. he acquired with it the equitable
right to all remedies for its enforcement. The continued substance of
the lien in his (the assignee's) favor, or for his benefit, does not de-
pend upon the subsistence or continuance of a personal liability of
the assignor to him, nor upon there being a written transfer of the
note passing the legal title."
This seems to be a more desirable view than that presented
in the Texas cases heretofore considered. According to the
better view, the assignment of one of the mortgage notes,
or bonds, ipso facto, operates in equity at least, to assign to
the transferee all of the remedies for its enforcement. While
the indorsement on the note or bond assigned may withhold
one of the remedies, it does not necessarily operate to ex-
clude the other remedies of the assignee. The personal lia-
bility of the assignor is quite distinct from right to resort to
the real security to enforce payment of note or bond as-
Is The court here cites and relies upon Ripperdon v. Cozine, 8 B. Mon.
465 (1848), a case that supports the same principle.
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signed. The latter right is based upon a trust arising by
operation of law.'9 While the mortgagee-assignor may ex-
clude this remedy by an express contract, a restrictive in-
dorsement, for instance, only operates to exclude any per-
sonal liability of the assignor and not to bar all of the reme-
dies of the assignee.2" The intention of the parties should
be directed specifically and expressly to this purpose to have
such effect. While the assignee may, by contract with the
mortgagee-assignor, be barred from resorting to the real
security, yet his right to resort to the real security does not
depend on any obligation on the part of the mortgagee-as-
signor to pay the note or bond assigned. His right appears
to depend on the fact that by becoming transferee of the
note or bond he thereby purchases an interest in the real
security sufficient to reimburse him for what he paid there-
for; and an indorsement that transfers the interest of the
mortgagee-assignor, whether it be restrictive, regular, qual-
ified, or in the form of an assignment, is sufficient for this
purpose.
Where the mortgagee assigns only one, or a part, of the
mortgage notes, or bonds, to a third person, retaining the
19 "It is perfectly well settled by the decisions of this and other courts,
that when a debt is secured by mortgage, the debt is the principal and the mort-
gage a mere accessory or incident, and that an assignment of the debt, unless
otherwise expressed, will be, in equity, an assignment of the mortgage also ...
When, therefore, Cullman, the mortgagee, transferred the second note falling
due to Harding, if there was no express reservation of his interest in the mort-
gage, the assignment of the note was an assignment of the mortgage, also, pro
tanto, and if Cullman had retained the remaining notes and the mortgage prop-
erty had proved insufficient for the payment of the entire debt, his assignee
would have been entitled to priority of payment." Per Ormond, J., in Cullman
v. Erwin, 4 Ala. 452 (1842).
"If it be true that the law, independent of any contract, transfers the mort-
gage with the note, so as to entitle the transferee to a preference over the mort-
gagee who held the first note, the proof in such case should be stronger still to
restrict this right. (See Collins vs. Irwin, executor of Hitchcock; 4 Ala. Rep.
[This is evidently a misprint, for the case apparently referred to is Cullman v.
Erwin, Adm'r., supra.]). Indeed, for myself, I confess I am not sure that not
only the mortgage, but all contracts to further the collection of this second note,
are transferred by operation of law with the note to the holder . . ." Per Lump-
kin, J., in Roberts and another v. Mansfield, 32 Ga. 228, 234 (1861).
20 See discussion in McClintic v. Wise's Adm'ors & Als., op. cit. supra. note 9.
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other, or others, and the assignment does not operate at law
to transfer the legal interest in the real security to the as-
signee, the legal interest retained by the mortgagee-assignor
is subordinate to the assignee's equitable interest, that is,
his priority of lien in the proceeds of the real security on
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises. In other
words, if the mortgagee-assignor is entitled to maintain
ejectment against the mortgagor, he thereby obtains no ad-
ditional advantage, if he. does so, for the assignee is entitled,
in equity at least, to this additional benefit.
Where the mortgagee assigns only one, or a part, of the
mortgage notes to A., and the remaining not.e, or notes, to-
gether with the real security, to B., B. would not necessarily
acquire any precedence from the fact of his holding the legal
title to the real security." B. might be enabled to invoke the
well established principle in equity that if a trustee disposes
of the trust estate to a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable
consideration, without notice of the trust, he will bar the
interest of the cestui que trust. But ordinarily the instru-
ment evidencing the real security would give B. notice of the
equity of A. which is prior in time. According to this prin-
ciple, it is important to determine whether one of the as-
signees acquires a legal or an equitable title to the chose. If
the second assignee acquires only an equitable title, then the
former assignee, if he has acquired only an equitable title,
would be prior in time and prior in right, if the two equities
are equal, and would have priority of lien in the proceeds
of the real security upon a sale thereof in foreclosure. If
21 Pomerory's Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.) § 1202, and cases cited.
"Each assignee is, through the mortgage, charged with notice of the equitable
interests of all the other assignees. The holder of a part of the notes, with a
formal assignment of the mortgage, acquires no precedence from the fact that
he is holding the mortgage." Per Maxwell, C. J., in Studebaker, etc., Co. v.
M'Curger, 30 N. W. 686, 678 (Neb. 1886).
But compare the dissenting opinion of Gibson, C. J., in Donley v. Hays,
op. cit. supra note 7: "In this case, had the subsequent assignees obtained a
legal assignment of the mortgage, it would have made a difference; for as there
would have been equity against equity, the legal title must have prevailed. But
as neither party has anything but an equity, priority of title is priority of right."
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the first assignee acquires only an equitable title and the
second assignee acquires the legal title, in addition to his
equitable title, and is not charged with notice of the interest
of the prior assignee, he would have priority of lien. If the
first assignee acquires a legal title as assignee, then he would
have priority of lien as against the second assignee even if
the latter had purported to acquire the legal tfle to the
chose.
Where several notes, or bonds, maturing at different times,
are secured by the same mortgage, and are assigned by the
mortgagee to different persons at different times, various
rules as to priority 22 of lien in the proceeds of the real se-
curity on foreclosure are adopted, in the absence of a special
contract between the mortgagee-assignor and one, or a part,
of the different assignees. One view is that the order of
maturity of the various notes, or bonds, determines the pri-
ority of lien. Another view is that the order in which the
assignments are made controls the priority of lien. In a
third class of cases the proceeds of the real security are ap-
plied pro rata in payment of the several notes, or bonds, ir-
respective of their dates of either maturity or assignment.
Some states that apply the rule that the order of maturity
controls priority of lien, do so only in case of simultaneous
assignments; if the assignments are not simultaneous, then
the order of the assignments controls. But in other states
the order of maturity controls priority of lien, irrespective
of the order of assignments. In some of the states that apply
the rule that the order of maturity controls the priority of
lien do so only where the notes were originally given to one
payee-mortgagee; but where the different notes secured by
22 See classification of authorities in Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 143 et seq.
"Where all the notes stand on the same footing,-that is, they are all pay-
able at the same time,-the equities of all the assignees are -equal, and there is
no preference or priority among them in enforcing the security of the mortgage.
All the assignees are entitled to a pro rata share of the proceeds of the mort-
gaged premises, in case there is not sufficient to pay all the notes in full."
Pomerory's Equity. jurisprudence (4th ed.) § 1201.
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one mortgage are issued to different payees, the pro rata
rule is adopted.13
The foregoing views as to priority of lien among the as-
signees of the several notes secured by one real security are
generally conceded to obtain only in the absence of a special
agreement between the mortgagee-assignor and one, or some,
of the assignees indicating a different intent.24 Thus the
mortgagee is entitled, in assigning one of the mortgage notes,
to agree that the assignee shall have priority of lien, and
such agreement will be binding on subsequent assignees of
the other notes, with notice thereof. Again, it is said that
since the distribution of the proceeds of the real security on
foreclosure among the several assignees of the various mort-
gage notes is based on equitable considerations, the rule
adopted in any particular state will not be applied if the
special circumstances of a particular case are such as to
render the application of the rule inequitable.25
The jurisdictions that adopt the order of assignment rule
as to priority of lien do so for the reason that the debt se-
cured is the principal and the mortgage an accessory, and
that the transfer of one of the mortgage notes carries with it
so much of the mortgage lien as is necessary to pay the note
assigned as effectually as the right of realization existed in
the mortgagee's favor; and that no second assignment can
divest the first assignee of his priority of lien. The priority of
lien existed as against the mortgagee-assignor, and the sec-
ond assignee can acquire no greater right in the real security
that the mortgagee had left to transfer after the first assign-
ment.26 The courts that adhere to the order of maturity
23 Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 145, 147.
24 See authorities in Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 147, 148.
25 Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 148, 149. In this Note it is said: "Thus in Robinson v.
Waddell, 53 Kan. 402, 36 Pac. 730, it was held that where the mortgagee in-
dorsed some of the notes generally and indorsed the others without recourse, the
latter notes were entitled to priority of payment out of the proceeds of the
mortgage. The contrary was, however, held in State Bank of O'Neill v. Matthews,
45 Neb. 659, 63 N. W. 930, 50 Am. St. Rep. 565."
26 Penzel v. Brookmire, 51 Ark. 105, 14 Am. St. Rep. 23 (1838).
PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
rule adopt the same reasoning; but they add that if the
mortgagee-assignor has retained all of the mortgage notes
until their dates of maturity he is entitled to have them paid
out of the proceeds of the real security on foreclosure in the
order of their maturity; or, upon default on the note, or
notes, falling due first, he is entitled to foreclose and thus
satisfy the notes in the order of their maturity. Therefore,
the second assignee, succeeding to the rights of the assignee
at the time of the assignment, is entitled to exercise the same
right." The argument is sQmetimes advanced in support of
the latter rule that the notes maturing at different times are
to be regarded as so many successive mortgages, each giving
priority according to the time of maturity.28 In Wilson v.
Eigenbrodt 29 the court discussed this reasoning as follows:
"This seems to us a gross misapplication of the maxim that 'he
who is first in time has the better right.' The different instalments
are not secured by different mortgages of different dates, but by one
mortgage executed equally for the benefit of all the instalments. The
date of the lien is the date of the mortgage, and not the date of the
maturity of the debt."
Again, in Penzel v. Brookmire " the court says:
"The comparison of a mortgage to secure several notes to suc-
cessive mortgages given to secure each one of them does not support
the doctrine it is made to prove. To make the cases analogous, the
mortgages to secure each note must bear the same date, and be exe-
cuted, delivered, and filed for record, and recorded, at the same time,
and the property mortgaged must be the same. In the latter case, the
mortgages would be concurrent; neither one would have preference
over the others, and all would have equal claims to be paid ratably
out of the property mortgaged. If one should be transferred to a third
27 Penzel v. Brookmire, op. cit. supra note 26.
Pomerory says that this rule is adopted in the greatest number of states, and
"seems to be based upon a correct application of equitable principles and anal-
ogies." Also, "The rights of the holders are fixed by what expressly appears upon
the face of the writings; the mortgage is a common bond uniting all the notes,
and the various assignees have through it a clear notice, of each other's rights."
Pomerory's Equity jurisprudence (4th ed.) § 1201, note 2.
28 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 27; Wilson v. Eigenbrodt, 30 Minn. 4, 13
N. W. 907 (1882).
29 Op. cit. supra note 28.
30 Op. cit. supra note 26.
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person it would not thereby become paramount to the others, but all
would stand on an equality. Hence the comparison does not sustain
the doctrine that the notes, while in the hands of different persons,
are entitled to priority of payment according to the order in which
they mature."
Many jurisdictions adopt the rule that the proceeds of
the real security are to be applied to all the mortgage notes,
in the hands of the various assignees, in the proportion of
their respective amounts without regard to the dates when
the notes were assigned or the dates when they respectively
matured." The real security is executed for the benefit of all
of the several notes secured by it. It does not provide that
one note shall be preferred to the others. The rights and in-
terests acquired by the various assignees of the mortgage
notes begin with the date of the real security, and not from
the maturity or assignments of the notes. The first assignee
is in a position to protect himself, ordinarily, by requiring
a special agreement of priority. The subsequent assignee,
or assignees, should be charged with notice of the first, or
prior, assignment. So it seems that they should participate
ratably in the proceeds of the real security on foreclosure
thereof.
The problem of competing interests in the real security
may, also, arise in cases involving the title of two claimants
to the real security itself, or in cases involving the enforce-
ment of the real security. In previous parts of this paper the
aspect of the real security as creating an interest in the mort-
gaged land, that is, a property interest, has been considered;
also, the theory that the real security accompanies the per-
sonal security as an incident thereto, has been discussed.
The latter principle involves problems connected with the
transfer of the ownership of the real security. The question
of the title of two claimants to the real security is, to some
extent, allied with that involving the enforcement of that
31 The greatest number of jurisdictions are said to adopt this rule. Ann. Cas.
1914 C, 143. But see note 27, supra. And compare the quotation from Pomerory's
Equity Jurisprudence, op. cit. supra note 22.
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security. Here we consider the aspect of the real security as
a chose in action-a transferable chose in action; and, as
such, its ownership involves not only the right to possess a
thing but the right to sue the obligor. As a chose in action,
the right to hold the thing and the right to enforce the obli-
gation are in the same person. A case may involve only the
ownership of the thing itself,-the mortgage deed; or it may
involve the right to enforce the obligation represented by
this instrument,--the right to foreclose. So interests in the
mortgage relation must be classified as they relate to the
ownership of the mortgage instrument or to liability on the
obligation evidenced by it. A mortgagee who has parted
with his mortgage may want it back so that he may collect it
at maturity; and an assignee, who has transferred the mort-
gage, may want it back so that he may collect it at maturity.
A person who never had title to a mortgage may have an
equitable claim to its ownership because it is held in trust
for him. If the trustee disposes of the mortgage deed the
cestui que trust has an equitable right to restitution of his
property. He may assert his equitable right to ownership in
an action of trover just like a person from whom a horse has
been bought by fraud. 2 Or he may bring an action to have
the mortgage adjudged to be held in trust for his benefit.3"
But here, of course, another doctrine may be applicable.
The purchaser may be a bona fide purchaser for a valuable
consideration, without notice of the trust, and so bar the
claim of the cestui que trust.
The equitable claim to ownership has nothing to do with
liability. Neither the mortgagee, his assignee, nor the cestui
32 Cf. Ames, Cases on Bills and Notes, 11, 693; Mercer v. Jones, 3 Camp.
477 (1813) (Trover for bills of exchange.).
33 In Dillaye v. Commercial Bank of Whitehall, 51 N. Y. 349 (1873), the
question was whether one who held a mortgage in trust with an apparently
unrestricted power of disposition could transfer it free from the claim of the
cestui que trust to a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the trust.
It was held that he could, in an action brought by the cestui que trust against
the purchaser to have the mortgage adjudged to be trust property for her benefit.
This case involved the title of two claimants to the mortgage itself, i. e., owner-
ship of the chattel.
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que trust is liable on the instrument. The remedy is affirma-
tive-not defensive.
The maker of a mortgage who has been induced to part
with it without consideration or by fraud has a defense at
law when he is sued on the mortgage. He may not wait until
he is sued at law on the mortgage and set up this defense,
but he may use it as a basis of a bill to enjoin the transfer
of the instrument and to have it surrendered and cancelled.
The latter type of relief, though affirmative in form, is de-
fensive in substance. The obligor is not seeking a return of
the instrument so that he may enforce it; and if there is a
decree of cancellation, the instrument does not go back to
the obligor but it is canceled and kept by the clerk of the
court. 4
This distinction between a claim asserted to the ownership
of the mortgage deed and rights asserted in defense to ac-
tions to enforce the mortgage has not always been observed
by the courts. There seems to be no doubt as to the general
rule that the assignee, or purchaser, of a non-negotiable
chose takes subject to defenses, valid as between the original
parties. 5 On the other hand, the rule seems to be well settled
that the bona fide purchaser for value of a non-negotiable
chose from an assignee may obtain a valid title as against
the former owner who had assigned the chose. The general
rule, in the latter class of cases, is that the bona fide pur-
chaser for value of a non-negotiable instrument from an
assignee of the owner upon whom that owner has by assign-
ment conferred the apparent absolute ownership acquires a
34 This whole matter is considered at length by Professor Chafee in his
valuable article entitled "Rights in Overdue Paper," 31 Har. L. Rev. 1104.
35 Since the non-negotiable note or bond secured by the mortgage are sub-
ject to equities of defense or ownership, the mortgage would likewise be sub-
ject to such equities. For these purposes the mortgage is considered as an incident
of the debt, and as a non-negotiable chose in action also.
"A mortgage under our laws is a mere chose in action; and aside from the
force of the recording statute, an assignee thereof--so far as concerns his right
as such to enforce the same-must be treated like the assignee of any other
chose in action." Per Earl, J., in Westbrook v. Gleason, 79 N. Y. 23, 29 (1879).
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valid title as against the owner. This rule is based on the
ground of estoppel, and it is held that the owner has, by his
act of investing another with the apparent ownership of the
property, estopped himself from disputing the title of one
who thereafter acquires it in good faith.irom such assignee.
This is a modification of the rule that one cannot sell more
than one has. If A. sells B. a horse which he has stolen, as a
general rule, B. is not entitled to claim title to the horse as
against the true owner; but if that owner happened to be
standing by at the sale, and saw B. purchase the horse and
pay for it, without objection from him, he might find it
difficult to reclaim the horse. The same principle would be
applicable to the mortgage in so far as the equity of owner-
ship is concerned. But the doctrine of estoppel, thus applied,
does not have the effect of making non-negotiable choses
negotiable. The assignee, or purchaser, takes the chose sub-
ject to equities of defense, valid as between the original
parties; and this distinction must be observed in reference
to rights of ownership, whether the ownership is asserted by
the mortgagee or by an assignee.
While a purchaser of a non-negotiable chose in action
takes it subject to the defenses existing between the orig-
inal parties thereto, it has been held that he does not take the
chose subject to the latent defensive equities of third per-
sons. Thus in Simpsoih v. Del Hoyo " the vendor of certain
real property was induced by the fraudulent representations
of L. to convey the property to his daughter, Miss L. The
latter mortgaged the property to L. as security for the pay-
ment of her bond. Subsequently L. assigned the bond and
mortgage to P., who was assumed to have paid value for
the same and to have had no notice of the fraud. It was
held that P. took free from the claim of the defrauded
vendor.
86 94 N. Y. 189 (1883).
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In Murray v. Lylburn 37 Chancellor Kent divided rights
(generally designated as "equities") of ownership into "la-
tent" (those not in the apparent chain of title) and "pat-
ent," and advanced the doctrine that the assignee of a non-
negotiable chose in action takes it free of latent, but subject
to patent, equities of ownership. Pending a suit against a
trustee of real estate for a fraudulent breach of trust, in
which an injunction had been obtained restraining him from
disposing of any part of the estate, he sold a part to one D.,
who executed a bond and mortgage for the purchase money,
which the trustee afterwards assigned to L., whose repre-
sentatives were made defendants. The Chancellor was of
the opinion that the cestui que trust might, at his option,
affirm the sale and claim the bond and mortgage, saying:
"It is a general and well-settled principle that the assignee of a
chose in action takes it subject to the same equity it was subject
to in the hands of the assignor .... But this rule is generally under-
stood to mean the equity residing in the original obligor or debtor,
and not an equity residing in some third person against the assignor.
. . . The assignee can always go to the debtor and ascertain what
claims he may have against the bond, or other chose in action, which
he is about purchasing from the obligee; but he may not be able,
37 2 Johns. Ch. 441 (1817).
"Chancellor Kent's doctrine, advanced in Murray v. Lylburn . . . and other
cases of that period, that the assignee of a non-negotiable chose and mortgage
takes them free of latent, though subject to patent, equities, retains some follow-
ing; for example, in Pennsylvania (Mifflin County Bank's Appeal, 98 Pa. 150)
.... But Kent's doctrine was disapproved in New York in Bush v. Lathrop
. . . and has been definitely rejected there as well as in a majority of the states
of this country; Central Trust Co. v. West India Imp. Co., 169 N. Y. 314 (1901)."
Campbell, Cases on Mortgages, 434, note.
"It has been held . . . in both Ohio and Illinois, that a holder in due course
of a negotiable note who also receives an 'assignment' of the mortgage takes
the latter, as well as the former, free from 'latent' equities. First National Bank
v. Brotherton, 78 Ohio St. 162 (1908); Silverman v. Bullock, 98 Il1. 11, 19
(1881)." Campbell, Cases on Mortgages, 439, note 2.
"It is further the settled law of this state, though a different rule prevails
not only in England, but in the Federal courts and in some of the states, that
a bona fide purchaser for value of a chose in action takes it subject not only
to the equities between the parties, but also to latent equities in favor of third
persons, and that to secure his superiority it is not necessary that the earlier
assignee should give any notice of his assignment to the debtor trustee." Per
Cullen, J., in Central Trust Co. of New York v. West India Improvement Co.,
169 N. Y. 314 (1901).
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with the utmost diligence, to ascertain the latent equity of some third
person against the obligee. He has not any object to which he can
direct his inquiries...2
The case was not, however, decided on that principle, but
on the ground that the lis pendens constituted a notice to
all parties dealing with the trustee respecting the trust
estate.
The distinction between latent and patent equities was
repudiated by the New York Court of Appeals, in Bush v.
Lathrop.3" In this case one N., the plaintiff's intestate,
owned a bond and mortgage for $1,400, and being indebted
to P., in the sum of $268.20, gave P. his note for that sum,
and assigned the bond and mortgage by an absolute and un-
conditional assignment to secure that note. P. subsequently
assigned the bond and mortgage to S., and S. assigned them
to D., for a valuable consideration. The plaintiff brought
his action to obtain a re-transfer of the bond and mortgage
on payment of the $268.20, with interest. Denio, J., in de-
livering the opinion of the court, reviews the decision of
Chancellor Kent, in Murray v. Lylburn, and other cases,
on the subject of "latent" equities, disapproving of the doc-
trine of Chancellor Kent, and came to the conclusion that
N., "the last absolute owner of the bond and mortgage, never
parted with his title except on condition that it should be
returned to him on payment of a comparatively small sum
of money... "; that D., who claimed under that assignment,
was bound by it, though he may not have actually been
aware of the fact that it was conditional; and that an as-
signee of a chose in action takes but an equitable interest,
notwithstanding the provisions of the Code which authorize
him to sue in his own name. The question of estoppel does
not seem to have been considered. Perhaps it would not
have been applicable since the assignment upon which the
"estoppel would have been predicated, if at all, expressed
a consideration of only $268.20 for a mortgage of $1,400,
88 22 N. Y. 535 (1860).
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a circumstance calculated to excite inquiry. If the assign-
ment had conferred the apparent absolute ownership of the
bond and mortgage on P., the doctrine of estoppel would
seem to have been applicable. In his opinion, Denio, J., said:
"All the cases agree that the purchaser of a chose in action takes
the interest purchased subject to all the defenses, legal and equitable,
of the debtor who issued the security. It is unnecessary to refer to
authorities for this general principle, or to point out the exceptions to
it which have been created by the custom of merchants or by positive
statutes. It is enough that the present case is not claimed to fall with-
in any of those exceptions. . . . The defendant claims that this is a
latent equity, available only between the parties to it, and that it did
not accompany the security when it passed into the hands of a sub-
sequent owner. The rule, as generally stated, is that the purchaser
takes only the interest which his assignor had to part with; or, as
expressed by Lord Thurlow, 'a purchaser of a chose in action must
always abide by the case of the person from whom he buys."'
In holding that the assignee took only such title as the seller
had, he admitted that this rule might constitute an impedi-
ment to the free negotiation of this class of choses in action,
but said that if sound policy required that it should be re-
moved it was for the legislature to so provide. 9
39 "... the assignee of a mortgage takes it subject to all the defenses which
were valid between the original parties, and this principle was borrowed from
Lord Thurlow's rule in Davies v. Austen, I Ves. Jr. 247. Within its legitimate
application, its correctness has not been disputed in this court; but because
of the broadness of its intended application in Bush v. Lathrop, it was soon
found necessary to place limitations upon the authority of that case in the
decisions in McNeil v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, and Moore v. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41.
They . . . held that a bona fide purchaser for value of a non-negotiable chose
in action, from one upon whom the owner has, by assignment, conferred the
apparent absolute ownership, where the purchase is made upon the faith of such
apparent ownership, obtains a valid title as against the real owner. The decision
in the latter case was based upon the doctrine of estoppel . . . The doctrine of
Bush v. Lathrop was so broad as to be inequitable in applying a principle
otherwise correct and undisputed to cases such as those of shares of corpora-
tions, or other personal property, the legal title being capable of transfer by
assignment, the true owner has apparently conferred upon agother full power
of disposition." Per Gray, J., in Merchant's Bank v. Weill, 57 N. E. 749, 750
(N. Y. 1900).
In Moore v. Metropolitan National Bank, 55 N. Y. 41, 14 Am. Rep. 173
(1873), P., the owner of a non-negotiable certificate of indebtedness, was in-
duced by false representations to assign it to M. The assignment was in writing
and stated that value had been received therefor. M. agreed to get it cashed in
three weeks or return it to P. Instead, M. assigned the certificate to the Bank
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to secure a loan then made, the latter taking it on the faith of the written as-
signment and without notice of the relations between P. and M. P. brought this
action to restrain disposition of and to recover possession of the certificate. It
was held that P. could reclaim the certificate only by paying the Bank the
amount of its loan to M. The court apparently relied on two reasons: (1) P.,
having by the assignment conferred the apparent absolute ownership on M., was
estopped to assert his ownership as against the Bank; and (2) Where one of
two innocent parties must suffer a loss from the fraud of a third, such loss shall
fall on the one, if either, whose act has enabled the fraud to be committed.
P. had by the assignment transferred all of his rights to the instrument to M.
for only one purpose. Cf. International Bank v. German Bank, 71 Mo. 183, 36
Am. Rep. 468 (1879).
In McNeil v. Tenth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. Rep. 341 (1871),
P., owner of a certificate of stock, delivered the certificate, indorsed with an
assignment and irrevocable power of transfer, to his brokers as collateral security
for a balance of $3,000; the brokers pledged it to X as collateral, and X pledged
it to the Bank as collateral security for a larger amount than $3,000, the latter
acting in good faith and without notice of the relations between P. and his
brokers. P. sued the Bank to compel surrender of the certificate. It was held
that P. could redeem the certificate only by payment of the amount of the
loan made by the Bank that remained unpaid. The owner of the certificate by
conferring upon the broker complete authority to sell and transfer it by in-
dorsing thereon the form of assignment for value received, and irrevocable power
to make all necessary transfer, clothed the broker with apparent ownership
which he could transfer to an innocent third person for value, so as to estop
the owner from questioning the title of the innocent purchaser.
In the Moore case it was said that where the owner of shares or chattels de-
livers to another the "script or the chattels, together with an absolute written
transfer of all his title thereto, he enables him to hold himself out as owner and:
as such, obtain credit upon and make sales of the property." According to this
statement, shares of stock and chattels come within the doctrine of estoppel.
It is not necessary to consider) here whether shares of stock are of a quasi-
negotiable nature. See Williston on Sales (2nd ed.) § 311. It seems sufficient to
say that the assignee of shares of stock may, under the doctrine of estoppel,
acquire a better right than his immediate transferor had. The same is true
where ordinary chattel property has been transferred by one who has only a
limited interest but has the apparent power of absolute disposition. In the ap-
plication of the doctrine of estoppel in this class of transactions there seems to
be no reason for inquiring whether the assignee acquires a legal or an equitable
interest. If the assignee acquires an equitable interest estoppel will prevent the
assertion of the legal title by the former absolute owner of the chose in
action. The same factual situation will estop one from asserting either a
legal or an equitable title. It may be contended that an assignee acquires a
legal title and an equity equal to that of the former absolute owner, so that
the doctrine that whei the equities are equal the legal title will give priority
of right applies; or, on the other hand, that the assignee acquires only an equi-
table title and the doctrine that where the equities are equal that which is
prior in time is prior in right applies. These principles may be applied where
the owner of the prior equity has created both interests in the thing claimed;
but they have no scope of operation in the cases involving the type of problem
under consideration, where the prior owner has created the situation wherein
the assignee acquires his interest. One is not to be deprived of one's interest
in a thing, whether it be an ordinary chattel or a non-negotiable chose in action,
merely because another has possession of that thing with the owner's consent
and purports to create an interest in the assignee. There is not necessarily any
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In Davis v. Bechstein 40 the plaintiff brought an action
to have a "bond and mortgage set aside and cancelled." She
had executed them to E., without consideration, to be used
by him as collateral security for his own note, upon which
he proposed effecting a loan for himself. E. failed to pro-
cure the loan and, after a request from the plaintiff to re-
turn them, assigned the bond and mortgage to the defendant
appearance of ownership here like there would be where the owner of a chattel
or of land purports to create successive competing interests therein in favor
of different persons.
An analogous proposition has arisen in a few cases, involving principles of
the law of agency. Thus in Bogert v. Stevens, 69 N. J. Eq. 800, 63 Atl. 246, 115
Am. St. Rep. 627 (1906), R. executed a mortgage to E. to secure a bond of the
same date, conditioned for the payment of $3,000. R. did not, in fact, receive
any part of the $3,000, for the mortgage and bond were given to enable E. to
raise the $3,000 in cash and pay the same over to R. E. assigned them to A. and
received the proceeds but did not pay them over to R. The court held that A.
took the mortgage and bond free from the defense of lack of consideration that
R. might have had to an action brought by E. to enforce them, on the theory
that R. had clothed E. with apparent absolute ownership and authority to trans-
fer a title to A. free from R.'s defense of lack of consideration. In Bunt v.
D'Andrea, 198 N. Y. S. 304 (1922), the assignee of a mortgage and bond exe-
cuted a power of attorney to his son authorizing the latter to release or assign
them, and the son transferred them to A., forging his father's name to a formal
written assignment and appropriating the proceeds. The court held that A. ac-
quired a valid title to the mortgage and bond as against the father, in an ac-
tion brought by the father to cancel the assignment and to foreclose the mort-
gage.
Professor Campbell, in referring to McNeil v. Tenth National Bank and
Moore v. Metropolitan National Bank, says: "Such cases are sometimes said to
involve the doctrine of estoppel by representation; a more accurate statement
of the rule is that, when one having an interest in a chose in action which is
embodied in a document .. .delivers the document to another person who falls
within its tenor, an assignee of the latter, if he be a bona fide purchaser or
incumbrancer for value and without notice, and if he receives delivery of the
document, is protected accordingly. Williston on Contracts, § 438." Campbell,
Cases on Bills and Notes, 582, note. But what is it that brings the transferee
within the tenor of the instrument? If it is the act of the former owner in con-
ferring upon the assignor of the transferee the apparent indicia of absolute
ownership, then the doctrine is to be rationalized on the basis of estoppel.
See criticism of the doctrine of estoppel in 1 Har. L. Rev. 1, 7, 8 (Ames,
Purchase for Value Without Notice); and see article by Chafee on "Rights in
Overdue Paper," op. cit. supra note 31.
40 69 N. Y. 440, 25 Am. Rep. 218 (1877).
"One who takes an assignment of a bond and mortgage . . . takes it sub-
ject not only to any latent equities that exist in favor of the mortgagor, but
also subject to the like equities in favor of third persons and strangers." Per
Allen, J., in Schaefer v. Reilly, 30 N. Y. 61 (1872). The court was considering
defensive equities in this case.
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for value and without notice of the plaintiff's equity of de-
fense. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to have the
bond and mortgage surrendered and cancelled. While E.
had possession of the instruments, his authority to use them
for any purpose had terminated. Yet if the defendant had
had enforceable right on the instruments the plaintiff was
not entitled to have them surrendered and cancelled. The
case came under the general rule that the assignee of a non-
negotiable chose in action takes it subject to the equities of
defense as between the original parties to the instrument.
While the relief sought by the plaintiff is affirmative in
form, it is defensive in substance. She had no right to a
return of the instruments and to sue on them. So defensive
equities may be set up in defense of an action brought
against the obligor on the instrument; or they may be used
as the basis of an action to have the instrument surrendered
and cancelled. There was no basis for an estoppel here ex-
cept the mere possession of the instruments. Possession
of other chattels does not per se create an estoppel. So the
possession alone is not sufficient to constitute a representa-
tion on the part of the plaintiff that E. will not divert the
instruments by using them as he did. Neither was there any
purpose on the part of the plainfiff to defraud assignees.
Probably the only way that the defendant could have ob-
tained protection against the plaintiff's defensive equity
would have been for him to have secured a statement from
her that she had no defense to an action to enforce the in-
struments."
A mortgagor, or other obligor, in a non-negotiable chose
in action may not only estop himself from asserting equities
of ownership as against an assignee, but he may estop him-
self, by a writing, or by his actual representations, or by con-
duct, or by his silence towards the assignee from setting up
41 Cf. Schaefer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 61 (1872). See McMullen v. Weuner,
16 Serg. & R. 18, 16 Am. Dec. 543 (1827).
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defensive equities. Thus where R. executed to E., without
consideration, a mortgage on certain real estate for $20,000,
and A. bought the mortgage from E. at a large discount,
$16,000, relying upon an affidavit made by R. that the
amount expressed in the mortgage was the true considera-
tion, it was held that R. was estopped from asserting a want
of consideration, to the full extent of the face value of the
mortgage.4 2
Defensive Equities-Collateral Agreement.-While the
assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action, in all jurisdic-
tions that have considered this question, takes subject to
defensive equities of the obligor, generally, in reference to
mortgages, they relate to defenses growing out of the original
transaction, and affecting their legal inception as obligations
of the mortgagor, such as lack of consideration, fraud, du-
ress, and usury, but not those which are collateral or inci-
dental. The assignee is not required to inquire as to such
defenses; and he does not take subject to them unless he has
notice of them or they constitute a part of the consideration
for the mortgage.4" In Merchants' Bank v. Weill" the mort-
gagor in a purchase-money mortgage attempted to exercise,
after the assignment, an option conferred by a secret agree-
ment to rescind the sale of the mortgaged property and thus
be relieved of the obligation of the bond and mortgage. This
collateral agreement, and an attempt to exercise the option,
were relied on as a defense to an action brought by the as-
signee to foreclose the mortgage. The court held that the
mortgagor was not entitled to assert this defense in the ac-
tion by the assignee who had acquired the bond and mort-
gage without notice of it. An assignee is not concerned with
42 Grissler v. Powers, 81 N. Y. 57, 37 Am. Rep. 475 (1880).
43 "Mortgages," 41 C. J. 692, and authorities cited.
44 163 N. Y. 486, 57 N. E. 749, 79 Am. St. Rep. 605 (19c0). Accord, Mc-
Masters v. Wilhelm, 85 Pa. 218 (1877). In the latter case the court said:
"... this agreement in no respect related to the validity of the instrument as-
signed, to the existence of the debt it secured, or to the amount of it that
was due."
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an agreement between the original parties to the non-nego-
tiable chose that is inconsistent with the purport or legal
effect of the instrument. The assignee should not be and is
not bound to call upon the obligor for information about
matters, the existence of which he has no reason to suspect.
Defensive Equities-Where There is a Right of Set-Off
Against the Assignor.-In Waterman on Set-Off 11 the prin-
ciples governing the right of set-off against an assignor are
stated as follows:
"Where, when a chose in action is assigned, there is an equitable
right of set-off against the assignor, the assignee will take the chose
in action, subject to such right of set-off. The equities need not exist
at the inception of the debt. It is sufficient if they exist prior to the
assignment; as the assignee can protect himself against them by in-
quiry of the debtor before the assignment."
The equitable right of set-off seems to come within the gen-
eral principle that the assignee succeeds only to the rights of
the assignor. Not only is the assignee required to inquire of
the obligor in the non-negotiable chose in action as to wheth-
er he has any defenses inherent in the inception of the obli-
gation evidenced by the instrument but also as to the state of
accounts existing between the obligor and the obligee-as-
signor. 6 Actions to enforce real securities, or to compel a
surrender thereof, have seldom included a set-off within the
controversy. In Norrish v. Marshal 47 the mortgagor brought
an action to have the mortgage deeds delivered up and to
restrain the assignee from pledging them. The plaintiff had
demised certain premises to C. and delivered the title-deeds
to the premises as security for a loan. The plaintiff repaid
part of the loan before and part after C. had assigned the
deeds to M.; but he had no knowledge of the assignment
45 § 103 (2nd ed.).
46 ". . . the assignee is not bound to call on the obligor for information
about matters, the existence of which he has no reason to suspect; the necessity
of inquiry being limited as I have said to want of consideration and set-off."
Per Gibson, J., in Davis v. Barr, 9 Serg. & Rawl. 137, 141 (1822).
47 5 Madd. 475 (1821).
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at the time of payment. In referring the matter to a master
to enquire as to what part of the debt had been paid, the
court said:
"The principle is that, as against an assignee without notice, the
mortgagor has the same rights as he has against the mortgagee, and
whatever he can claim in the way of set-off, or mutual credit, as
against the mortgagee, he can claim equally against the assignee."
Statutes have been enacted in most, if not all, of the states
providing in substance that in case of an assignment of a
chose in action, the action of the assignee shall be without
prejudice to any set-off or other defense existing at the time
of or before notice of the assignment. Some statutes express-
ly except negotiable promissory notes and bills of exchange,
and others except negotiable bonds also, from the operation
of the principle, where they are transferred before maturity.
Under the Georgia Civil Code, excepting "negotiable securi-
ties," the Supreme Court of Georgia stated the following
principles as controlling the right of set-off:
"... in a suit upon [a negotiable instrument]. . . brought by a
plaintiff who took the same from the payee after it was due, the rule
is that the maker cannot set off a demand against the payee, unless
such demand is connected with or grew out of the original transac-
tion for which the [instrument]. . . was given, or attaches to the
[instrument] . . . itself. He cannot set off a demand arising out of
collateral matters. A different rule, however, applies to non-negotiable
instruments, and that is 'that every person who takes an instrument
not assignable by the terms of it must take it principally on the
credit of him from whom he receives it, for it is always liable to be
defeated by equitable circumstances subsisting between the original
parties, being taken legally subject to all equities of the original
debtor.' This distinction is recognized in the ... Civil Code . ." 4
W. D. Rollison
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
48 Third Nat. Bank v. Western & A. R. Co., 114 Ga. 890, 40 S. E. 1016
(1902). The Georgia statute, referred to in this case, provided: "All choses in
action arising upon contract may be assigned so as to vest the title in the
assi.rnee, but he takes it, except negotiable securities, subject to the equities
existing between the assignor and debtor at the time of the assignment, and until
notice of the assignment is given to the person liable."
See Note on "set-off" as a defense against an assignee, 14 Har. L. Rev. 546.
